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Of the countries affected by the recent economic crisis in East Asia, Malaysia has 
attracted particular attention. Malaysian policymakers have consistently flouted 
conventional wisdom about the most appropriate ways of managing the crisis, in 
particular, and national economies, more generally, in an era characterised by 
increased international integration, both economic and political. Not only has 
Malaysia, under the leadership of its Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir 
Mohamad, refused to adhere to the neoliberal orthodoxy of liberalisation and financial 
opening, but the Malaysian government embarked upon a systematic counter-
offensive designed to mitigate the influence of external economic forces and retain a 
degree of national policy autonomy. 
 
The Malaysian experience begs a number of critical questions that have the potential 
to tell us much about the contingent factors that continue to shape national policy in 
an era of globalisation and about the limits of the globalisation process: why would a 
comparatively small economy like Malaysia risk incurring the wrath of influential 
external actors like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the increasingly 
powerful financial markets? Even if the political will exists to develop policies 
designed to confer a degree of domestic insulation, how feasible is this in the 
contemporary global political economy? What does the Malaysian case tell us about 
the fate of East Asian "dirigiste capitalism" more generally? 
 
To begin to answer these questions, it is vital to separate the contingent from the 
universal. Consequently, the first part of this paper briefly sketches the qualities of the 
globalisation phenomenon before considering their relevance in a Malaysian context. 
The intention here is to demonstrate that even if it is possible to agree on a general 
conceptualisation of globalisation, the Malaysian exemplar demonstrates that it is 
realised in different ways -- as the second part of the paper illustrates. The central 
contention I develop is that, although the terrain upon which national policymakers 
must operate has been transformed by ubiquitous political and economic processes, it 
is still possible to respond to such apparently universal imperatives in distinctive, not 
to say idiosyncratic, ways. While the motivations underpinning the Malaysian 
government's policy initiatives may be questionable and informed by a parochial 
political calculus, nevertheless, the very fact that such responses are possible at all is 
of major long-term significance in the context of debates about the future of economic 
development generally. Moreover, despite his routine vilification in much of the 
Western media and legitimate concerns about the authoritarian nature of his 
leadership, Mahathir identifies a number of key issues about the relationship between 
states and markets, and about the ability of individual countries to pursue distinctive 
national policies, that have a relevance transcending the Malaysian case. 
 
The Contingent and the Universal 
 
Before considering how and why Malaysian authorities responded in the way they did 
to the globalisation phenomenon in general and the Asian crisis in particular, it is 
necessary briefly to outline the more pertinent factors associated with globalisation, 
before detailing the particular Malaysian circumstances through which such processes 
were refracted. Consequently, the first part of this section will sketch the 
transformation of the international political economy before considering Malaysia's 
integration into it, and the unique social and political circumstances through which 




The notion of globalisation has rapidly become an established part of academic 
discourse and popular commentary in recent decades. Its very ubiquity is indicative of 
the fact that it signifies something alternative perspectives lack. In other words, there 
is something about the contemporary era - particularly the way complex economic 
and, to a lesser extent, political processes are organised - that distinguishes it from 
earlier periods, and which the notion of globalisation seems to capture. Although there 
is broad agreement that dramatic changes have occurred in the international system, 
the extent and significance of such developments are much more contentious. 
 
As well as providing a judicious overview of debates that lie beyond the scope of this 
essay, Held, et al., provide their own definition of globalisation which captures its 
most important aspects: 
 
A process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial 
organisation of social relations and transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, 
intensity, velocity and impact - generating transcontinental or interregional flows and 
networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power. [1] 
 
Before we can assess the impact of such processes on Malaysia, however, it is 
necessary to spell out more precisely the sorts of reorganisations and flows that are 
involved here. For the purposes of this paper, there are three critical aspects of 
globalisation that need to be considered: the expansion and liberalisation of the 
financial sector; the international reorganisation of "real" economic activity; and the 
transnationalisation of structures of governance and the erosion of state authority. 
 
Although Malaysia in general and Mahathir in particular have been primarily 
associated with the financial aspects of globalisation, it should be remembered that it 
was the reorganisation of underlying "real" economic activity across national borders 
that ultimately helped accelerate the economic development of countries like 
Malaysia and integrate them more fully into the global economy. The emergence of a 
"new international division of labour" in the 1960s and 1970s and the spatial 
reconfiguration of economic activity via the disaggregation of production processes 
allowed companies to relocate their activities internationally and, in East Asia in 
particular, to take advantage of cheap labour or generous government incentives. The 
success of export-oriented strategies of rapid industrialisation in countries like 
Malaysia were especially dependent on foreign investment and access to important 
markets in North America and Europe, which the general reconfiguration of the 
international-political economy opened u p. [2] 
 
Globalisation is necessarily a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon. Not only is it 
necessary to unpack its constituent elements, but it is important to recognise that some 
of the "flows" described above are potentially much more welcome and beneficial 
than others. As we shall see, this is something Mahathir has clearly recognised, and 
this helps explain the vehemence of his attack on another critical element of 
globalisation: the growing power of financial markets. 
 
The integration of international financial markets is arguably the most complete 
realisation of the globalisation process. The ease and speed with which capital flows 
can traverse national borders make them emblematic of the new international order. 
The story of the growth and ubiquitous influence of financial markets, and the 
critically important role that technological and also political forces played in their 
rise, is well enough known to need no repetition here. [3] However, a number of 
points merit emphasis as they help to explain the hostility that Mahathir has expressed 
toward them. The principal factor to stress here is the sheer scale of financial 
movements relative to national economies, especially comparatively small ones like 
Malaysia's. By some estimates, capital flows throughout the world's financial markets 
have reached some US$2 trillion per day, [4] compared to Malaysia's annual GDP of 
US$98 billion in 1997. Compounding the threat posed by such massive flows of 
capital -- from the perspectiv e of national economic managers, at least -- is the fact 
that up to ninety-seven percent of such inflows may be speculative, highly liquid and 
very different from the long-term direct investment associated with the expansion and 
transformation of real productive activity. Although the reasons for the recent crisis in 
Asia are complex, few would dispute that financial markets played a critical role that 
was amplified by their sheer magnitude. Indeed, it is worth noting that Malaysia's 
imposition of currency controls has received significant support -- albeit qualified -- 
from respected orthodox economists like Paul Krugman. [5] 
 
From the perspective of East Asian governments, which have traditionally used forms 
of tightly controlled, directed credit to guide the process of economic development, 
the opening up of what were hitherto relatively insulated domestic financial sectors is 
a potentially risky venture. While this may offer domestic borrowers the chance to 
access large and possibly cheaper sources of foreign capital, it may come at the cost 
of reduced control over the economy and risk greater exposure to precisely the sorts 
of destabilising financial flows that precipitated the Asian crisis. Importantly, 
financial sector liberalisation has often occurred despite, rather than because of, the 
efforts of national policymakers in East Asia. Even in Japan, the original home of East 
Asian-style state-led development, financial sector liberalisation occurred as a 
consequence of a complex mix of domestic and external forces, in which the shifting 
preferences of domestic companies and banks were combined with external pressures, 
especi ally emanating from the U.S., to force further liberalisation despite resistance 
from government authorities. Because economic liberalisation -- especially in the 
financial sector -- is so fundamentally threatening to EastAsian patterns of economic 
organisation, regional critics such as Mahathir have been able to portray it as part of a 
larger assault by "the West" designed to keep "Asia" in a subordinate position: 
 
Why, it must be asked, should the Western powers and investors conspire to topple 
Asia? The possible motives are not difficult to imagine. Considering the speed at 
which Asia was growing, the region appeared to be on its way to dominate the world 
economically. Whether or not Asia would eventually have come to dominate the 
region is irrelevant; the region was perceived as a threat to Western hegemony...I do 
not believe there was a conspiracy against the East Asian nations, at least not in the 
conventional sense of the word. But obviously their troubles have afforded an 
opportunity to force open their economies and allow domination by more powerful 
nations. [6] 
 
In this reading of globalisation, the rise of financial markets is not seen simply as part 
of a universal process of secular change driven by technological innovation and 
economic restructuring, but as a process in which specific national or even regional 
interests are being served. Rather than seeing the erosion of state sovereignty and the 
emergence of powerful transnational or inter-governmental organisations like the 
IMF, the World Bank or the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) as simply an 
expression of a third, political aspect of globalisation -- a general reconfiguration of 
government authority and practice in response to ubiquitous imperatives -- Mahathir 
sees such developments as part of a process that not only originated in the West, but 
which actively favours particular interests there. In other words, what we are 
witnessing is not a ubiquitous process in which all states are seeing a "leakage" of 
power to markets, but rather a hegemonic application of neo-colonial political power 
designed t o shore up "Western" interests. 
 
Clearly, there are a number of problems with such broad-brush depictions of either 
"Asia" or "the West." Yet, despite the imprecision, it is important to recognise that not 
only do Mahathir's arguments often find a receptive audience in Malaysia, but they 
also highlight issues that have a much broader relevance. Before exploring the latter's 
implications and the distinctive response they have engendered in Malaysia, the 
domestic basis of Mahathir's policies, perspectives and support needs to be considered 
in more detail. 
 
Contingent Malaysian Factors 
 
Historically, Malaysia's distinctive ethnic mix has shaped and constrained politics and 
public policy. Malaysia's population is composed of an, at times, volatile mix of 
indigenous Malays (or Bumiputeras), a substantial Chinese community, and a smaller 
group of Indians. When Malaysia gained independence from Britain in 1957, the size 
of the Malay and non-Malay populations were roughly balanced. By 1990, the 
Bumiputera share was approaching 60 percent, the Chinese share had fallen to around 
30 percent and the Indian to about 10 percent. Although ethnically based politics and 
economic divisions are less important than they once were, it is important to 
remember that Mahathir first came to prominence by articulating an indigenous 
response to what he called the "Malay dilemma," [7] and that the new indigenous 
Malay capitalist class is largely a creation of the state. 
 
This complex amalgam of racial and economic goals, and the way it has been 
mediated by Malaysia's ethnically divided political system, explains much about the 
genesis and spread of so-called "crony capitalism," and the sort of defensive 
economic policies that the Malaysian government has subsequently pursued. A major 
goal of the New Economic Policy (NEP) was to place thirty percent of share capital in 
Bumiputera hands by 1990. To achieve this, "trust agencies" were established by the 
government to accumulate shares on behalf of the Malay community, with the 
purported intention of redistributing them at some future date. Consequently, the 
public sector and state-owned enterprises expanded dramatically during the 1970s and 
early 1980s, establishing the basis for the fusion of government and business interests 
which is now so characteristic of the Malaysian political economy, and which has 
attracted such widespread criticism of East Asian forms of capitalism and business 
practices in the wake of the Asian econo mic crisis. 
 
It is, however, important to make a number of comparative points that distinguish the 
Malaysian case and that highlight the contingent way in which processes of 
globalisation are realised. First, because Bumiputera capitalists are essentially a 
creation of the state, conventional distinctions between the political and economic 
spheres are simply not applicable. Malaysia's overarching politico-ethnic imperative -
- maintaining racial stability through the creation of a domestic capitalist class -- has 
led to a fusion of political and economic interests. The principal instrument of Malay 
political power, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), is itself deeply 
involved in economic activity: the UMNO has created and controls a "vast 
conglomerate" of companies and corporate investments which include most sections 
of the economy. [8] Consequently, key individuals in both the UMNO political party 
and in the government have achieved considerable economic enrichment -- primarily 
as a direct consequence of the ir political connections. The current minister of special 
functions and executive director of the National Economic Action Council (the body 
charged with developing a response to the crisis) has, for example, been a major 
beneficiary of Malaysia's positive discrimination toward Bumiputeras and the 
concomitant fusion of political and economic power. Gomez and Jomo have detailed 
how Daim Zainuddin's political position and connections have allowed him to 
develop extensive business interests and significant personal wealth. Indeed, they 
claim that the "ethnic cudgel" of Bumiputera advancement has enabled "influential 
Malay politicians and businessmen with close links to the UMNO" to systematically 
amass great personal wealth. [9] 
 
While the exploitation of political connections for personal gain is hardly unique to 
Malaysia, let alone East Asia, there are aspects of the Malaysian case that are 
distinctive and also contradictory. Malaysia does not fit easily into the generally 
laudatory depictions of "miraculous" East Asian development in which a relatively 
autonomous bureaucracy is understood to have guided the process of economic 
expansion. Not only is the elected government in Malaysia a far more important actor 
than is the case in countries like Japan, but Mahathir in particular has little sympathy 
for the bureaucracy and has systematically wound back its influence and 
independence. [10] Indeed, Mahathir has expressed highly ambivalent, yet 
interconnected, views of both the bureaucracy and market forces. On the one hand, 
Mahathir has been keen to exploit the dynamism of market forces to shake up the 
bureaucracy and Malay values. On the other hand, the mechanism that might 
transform Malay values -- market forces -- and help make the Bumiputeras more 
"authentic" capitalists and less dependent on either state assistance or politically 
strategic relationships with Chinese business people is precisely the force that 
Mahathir has so inveighed against on the world stage. [11] 
 
In short, Mahathir seeks to exploit what he takes to be the beneficial, transformative 
effects of market forces without sacrificing government control or oversight. This 
contradictory position is explained by the intersection of politics and economics in 
Malaysia: much of the UMNO's appeal has been derived from what Crouch calls its 
"patronage-dispensing function." [12] The maintenance of the UMNO's dominant 
political position is still dependent on its ability to control and distribute economic 
resources -- something which is threatened by the sort of wholesale reforms that have 
been advocated, and to some degree implemented, in countries like Indonesia. And 
yet Malaysia demonstrates that it is possible to respond to apparently universal forces 
in quite distinctive ways. For example, the sorts of privatisation measures which have 
become such a ubiquitous part of public policy throughout the world have, in a 
Malaysian context, become a vehicle for the consolidation of political and economic 
power for a privil eged, predominantly Malay elite. As Searle observes, "whatever the 
economic arguments for privatisation, the raison d'etre for the program in Malaysia 
has been primarily political." [13] In other words, when mediated throughout the filter 
of Malaysia's highly distinctive ethnic and political structures, even one of the 
hallmarks of globalisation -- privatisation -- and the supposed retreat of the state, is 
revealed to be very different from the prevailing stereotypical depiction. 
 
But it is important to recognise that privatisation policies, although given additional 
momentum by international fashions and pressures, are effectively realised within the 
confines of national economic spaces -- however theoretically problematic and 
pragmatically porous such a conception may be. A number of other processes more 
directly associated with globalisation have provided even greater challenges for the 
leaders of all nations, but especially for smaller economies like Malaysia. It is the 
highly distinctive nature of the Malay leadership's response that makes it especially 
noteworthy and illuminates the limits of national autonomy in the contemporary 
global political economy. 
 
A couple of additional points also merit emphasis. First, the Malaysian economy is 
already very "open" by international standards, and has become steadily more so. 
Imports plus exports of goods and non-factor services represented 211 percent of 
GDP in 1998, up from 105 percent as recently as 1988. [14] Put simply, this means 
that Malaysian policy-makers are extremely dependent on maintaining access to the 
wider international economy. Moreover, not only has Malaysia's exposure to the 
international trading system grown dramatically, but the sorts of things Malaysia 
exchanges with the world have also changed. The second point to emphasise, then, is 
that there has been a profound secular change in the structure of Malaysia's economy: 
manufacturing had grown to more than 33 percent of GDP by the mid-1990s, up from 
less than 7 percent at the time of independence in 1957. [15] It has been this rise of 
manufacturing (and the concomitant relative decline of agriculture) that has 
underpinned the high GDP growth rates and the rising living standards that have been 
associated with East Asian industrialisation. Importantly, it has been precisely the 
provision of "substantive performance and material benefits" that has underpinned the 
legitimacy of, and popular support for, recent Malaysian governments. [16] In an 
environment in which governments appear unable to deliver on such a commitment 
and appear powerless to insulate society from external shocks, the basis of 
governmental authority is inevitably undermined. 
 
The potential for economic problems to spill over into the political arena was clearly 
demonstrated in the downfall of Anwar Ibrahim. There is no intention here to analyse 
that episode in detail, [17] other than to note, first, that the economic crisis 
exacerbated existent leadership tensions, and second, that external agencies like the 
IMF consciously tried to influence Malaysian domestic politics in support of Anwar, 
who was perceived to be a champion of the "market-friendly" policies the IMF was 
striving to encourage throughout the region. [18] This domestic and international 
political struggle makes any "objective" reading of Malaysia's response to the crisis 
especially difficult. If nothing else, the episode serves to remind us just how 
intimately connected politics and economics are, especially in Malaysia. Nevertheless, 
an examination of Malaysia's response to the crisis in particular and to globalisation 




Malaysia's Response to Globalisation and Crisis 
 
Like every other nation that has opened itself up to or tried to integrate with the 
international economy, Malaysian policymakers must attempt to deal with the three 
elements of globalisation detailed earlier: the internationalisation and expansion of 
financial markets; the transformation of global production processes; and the re-
configuration of political authority. 
 
Taming the foreign beasts 
 
One aspect of Malaysia's response to the crisis and the challenge of globalisation has 
attracted more attention than any other. What Mahathir has described as the "foreign 
beasts" of international financial markets, [19] are emblematic of globalisation and, 
from Mahathir's perspective at least, potentially threatening to Malaysia's existent 
political economy. It should be noted, however, that there is more than an element of 
hypocrisy in Malaysia's position: the central bank (Bank Negara), took a much more 
benign view of financial markets before it lost about US$2 billion speculating in 
international currency markets. However, the action that probably proved most 
decisive in winning the domestic policy debate over responses to globalisation was 
Mahathir's removal of the central bank governor -- an Anwar ally -- Tan Sri Ahmad 
Mohamed Don, and also his deputy. [20] This effectively marked the end of possible 
central bank independence of the sort encouraged by the IMF and other multilateral 
agencies. 
 
There are, by now, a number of detailed analyses of the East Asian crisis which have 
stressed the role played by massive flows of highly mobile, short-term capital in 
precipitating events. [21] One of the key points to emerge from such analyses is that, 
whatever the nature of domestic or generic problems in East Asian forms of 
capitalism, there is widespread agreement that contemporary financial markets pose 
particularly acute risks for comparatively small economies and that these 
arrangements played a major role in precipitating the crisis. Although access to large 
pools of international capital obviously has the potential to speed up the process of 
development through increased flows of investment, the potential for speculation and 
misallocation of resources is greater where such "investments" are short-term, 
unhedged, and channeled through poorly regulated domestic intermediaries. 
 
Although Malaysia has suffered from many of the same problems and shortcomings 
as its neighbors, it is important to stress that, in many respects, Malaysia's "economic 
fundamentals" were acknowledged to be quite respectable and certainly considered to 
be much healthier than either Thailand's or Indonesia's. Consequently, Malaysian 
public officials have been especially indignant about the "herd" behavior of financial 
markets and the adverse judgements of international ratings agencies, which appeared 
to lump together a number of East Asian nations fairly indiscriminately, encouraging 
further capital flight, some of which, it should be noted, was domestic. They have a 
point. Short-term debt as a percentage of foreign exchange reserves (one of the key 
indicators of potential financial vulnerability), despite having more than doubled in 
less than four years, was significantly lower in Malaysia (62 percent) in mid-1997 
than it was in Indonesia (182 percent), Korea (214 percent) or Thailand (153 percent). 
[22] Like wise, Malaysia's current account deficit as a percentage of GDP did not 
exceed the psychologically important -- in the minds of market players, at least -- 6 
percent barrier during the four years preceding the crisis, and returned to a healthy 
positive surplus of 13 percent in 1998. [23] This is not to suggest that the Malaysian 
economy was without problems. As the National Economic Action Council's initial 
report acknowledged, "excessive" credit creation in the non-tradable sector had fueled 
an unsustainable and speculative property boom. [24] However, from the perspective 
of a number of prominent domestic commentators, [25] Malaysia appeared to be 
unfairly targeted by international financial markets, fuelling a sense of indignant 
nationalism that has effectively bolstered Mahathir's position. 
 
Thus, a number of factors encouraged Malaysia's eventual experiment with capital 
controls. First and foremost, Malaysia's initial experiment with IMF-style policies of 
fiscal austerity appeared only to exacerbate adverse domestic economic conditions 
and, in any case, did little to the win the support and approbation of "the markets." 
Second, the ground swell of nationalism and anti-Americanism that developed in 
Malaysia in the wake of the crisis was partly encouraged by Malaysia's political elite 
and gave it the support it needed for what would otherwise have been generally 
considered a highly risky strategy. What is significant, as far as a more general 
assessment of national autonomy in the face of the globalisation of financial markets 
is concerned, is that when capital controls were imposed, for whatever reason or 
rationale, they appear to have been relatively successful. [26] 
 
The central goal of Malaysian policy was to regain control over the value of the 
ringgit. This was achieved by reducing its internationalisation via revamped external 
account regulations and, in September 1998, by fixing its value against the U.S. 
dollar. Malaysian authorities wanted to reduce domestic interest rates by curbing the 
outflow of ringgit, an outflow that was being driven by higher interest rates (20 to 40 
percent) in offshore markets. Simultaneously, inflows of short-term capital were 
curbed by requiring such capital to remain within Malaysia for a minimum of twelve 
months. The intention was to provide authorities with sufficient "breathing space" to 
stimulate a domestic economic revival without incurring an adverse reaction from 
financial markets. [27] 
 
Given that a generalised recovery now appears to be occurring throughout East Asia 
(with the noteworthy exception of Japan), it is difficult to make a definitive judgement 
about how important such controls have been in underpinning Malaysia's own 
recovery. What can be said, however, is that even for a comparatively small economy 
like Malaysia's where the political will exists -- for whatever reason -- it appears that 
autonomous policy options still exist, even in a globalised economy dominated by 
financial markets. At the very least, such controls appear to have insulated Malaysia 
from the sort of catastrophic economic downturns that occurred in Indonesia, 
Thailand and South Korea. Moreover, the continuing inflow of capital and the 
demonstrated ability of the Malaysian government to raise money in offshore markets 
suggests that such controls are not fatal impediments to long-term investor 
confidence. On the contrary, there has been a "flood" of foreign direct investment into 
Malaysia in the wake of the crisis , of precisely the sort the government is most keen 
to attract. [28] From Mahathir's perspective, then, Malaysia has been able to escape, 
to some degree at least, from what he calls the new "colonialism" he claims was being 
imposed via global financial markets, and has thus been able to maintain a degree of 
autonomy in the most globalised sector of the international economy. Precisely the 
same sort of logic is at work in Malaysia's approach to the "real" economy. 
 
The Malaysian developmental state 
 
Some of the most important theoretical questions to emerge in the wake of the crisis 
revolve around the efficacy of state "intervention" in the real economy. One of the 
hallmarks of the so-called developmental state pioneered by Japan was a willingness 
and a capacity to seek to direct the pattern and course of economic development. The 
rationale for employing a range of industrial policies was essentially that states are 
better able to coordinate complex economic decision-making processes, overcome 
potential market failures, and generally encourage the development of more 
strategically important, wealth-generating industries than would otherwise be the 
case. Whatever problems Japan may currently be experiencing, its capacity to 
accelerate and continually upgrade the process of industrialisation was remarkably 
successful over many years. It was precisely because Japan was both successful and 
Asian that it was of such "enormous importance, not just economically, but also 
symbolically and psychologically," [29] 
 
 
The logic behind Mahathir's "Look East" policy, and the self-conscious emulation of 
the Japanese model, was to overcome the constraints of both "late" development and a 
post-colonial economic structure. Again, it is important to recognise that, while the 
Malaysian variant of the developmental model may have been distorted by contingent 
ethnic factors and the need to maintain a regime predicated on patronage, the 
rhetorical justification for Mahathir's initiatives has potential merit and wider 
implications. Mahathir recognised that the secular downturn in the value of resource 
products on world markets, and the corresponding relative increase in the value of 
manufactured products, meant that nations without a manufacturing capacity were 
destined to experience declining living standards. In other words, prospering in a 
global economy was dependent on producing the sorts of products that fetched the 
highest prices on international markets. In an increasingly competitive international 
environment, in which many g overnments were attempting to encourage a similar 
transition to an industrialised economy, government assistance appeared to be an 
essential component of the development process. This was especially so in an 
environment in which the established industrial powers dominated many of the most 
lucrative niches of the global economy and where the international system itself was 
less accommodating of aspiring industrial nations than it had been when Japan, and 
the first generation of newly industrialising countries (NIC) prospered. 
 
While Mahathir's high-profile mega-projects have attracted widespread criticism both 
inside and, particularly, outside Malaysia, their essential logic often reflects a highly 
sophisticated and increasingly mainstream understanding of the preconditions for 
sustained industrial development. The "Multi-media Super-corridor" (MSC), for 
example, is based squarely on a widespread belief that industrial evolution and 
innovation is dependent upon (or likely to occur more readily where) "clusters" of 
similar industries exist, and where individual companies can take advantage of crucial 
"spillovers," externalities, and the benefits of agglomeration. While the precise 
contours of any national institutional matrix for the coordination of economic activity 
may reflect contingent factors, there is increasing agreement that some are more 
conducive to industrial innovation than others and that governments have an 
important role to play in this regard. [30] The MSC project is an emblematic and 
integral part of a wider goal o f national economic and social development outlined in 
Mahathir's "Vision 2020. [31] What detracts from this vision of establishing such 
advanced technocratic competence, of course, is the way Mahathir has used the 
national oil company, Petronas, to finance theoretically dubious projects like the 
national capital, Putrajaya, or to bail out high-profile corporations subject to little 
public oversight or accountability. [32] 
 
Malaysia's reliance on foreign capital and the need to accommodate and respond to 
the bargaining power of comparatively footloose international capital has, however, 
clearly placed limits on government authority. Critics have pointed out that the course 
of industrialisation in Malaysia, especially the utilisation of export processing zones, 
has failed to generate complex "backward" and "forward" linkages between the 
"domestic" and "external" economies. [33] Nevertheless, industrialisation has 
occurred at a rate that, until recently, excited widespread admiration. What is of 
significance here is that the manner of this development - whatever the political 
imperatives underpinning it may have been - suggests that not only are there still a 
variety of ways of responding to the universal imperatives of globalisation, but that 
even for comparatively small economies like Malaysia's, potentially effective 
strategies of intervention remain open to national governments. Yet, where such 
contingent responses continue t o exist, and where they are taken to confer "unfair" 
advantages on practicing governments, they have increasingly been subjected to 
international attempts to establish a so-called "level playing field." It is arguably this 
latter development that stands as the greatest challenge to Malaysia's pursuit of 
autonomy. 
 
The politics of economic independence 
 
The management of the East Asian crisis and its aftermath was an unambiguously 
international affair. Given the increased economic integration associated with 
processes of globalisation this is, perhaps, not surprising. States acting alone are 
simply not capable of providing the sort of international operating environment and 
transnational public goods that are required to sustain a complex international 
economic system and the sort of private-sector activities that need to occur within it. 
[34] In other words, some degree of international cooperation between states -- and by 
implication some diminution of state sovereignty -- is an inescapable facet of the 
contemporary global political economy. What was most striking about the 
management of the East Asian crisis, however, has been the role played by a number 
of extra-regional actors and agencies, and the systematic attempt to impose a very 
different, market-centered neoliberal economic order on a region in which the state 
has traditionally played a much large r role. Mahathir's response to the crisis, and to 
the process of greater integration of political as well as economic activities, can only 
be understood by recognising that such processes present an especially acute 
challenge to the leaders of countries, like Malaysia, where politics and economics are 
tightly fused. 
 
The increasingly influential discourse of market-centered reformism being promoted 
by powerful international organisations like the IMF and the World Bank -- and also 
actively supported by the United States -- presents a direct threat to a number of East 
Asian countries. While generally presented as a technically neutral model for 
promoting greater economic efficiency and accountability through practices of "good 
governance," the agenda being advocated by the World Bank and the IMF is designed 
to sever the nexus between government and business that has been so characteristic of 
East Asian development. What is novel about the contemporary world order in this 
regard is that external agencies and multilateral agreements are being increasingly 
employed to "lock-in" neoliberal reforms and to consolidate the separation of political 
and economic processes, something that is taken to be a central part of effective 
reform. [35] Given this backdrop, some of Mahathir's initiatives begin to seem less 
like the idiosyncra tic reactions of a leader out of contact with economic reality, and 
to appear more as politically rational responses to the challenge of maintaining power 
and national autonomy. 
 
Mahathir's proposed East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), for example, were it to be 
successfully developed, might provide an altogether more permissive, less intrusive 
regional economic grouping than its Anglo- American dominated, market-oriented 
equivalent, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEG) forum. [36] Likewise, 
Japan's proposal to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), in order to generate a 
specifically regional response to the crisis, can be represented as an opportunity to 
manage currency turbulence without the necessity of succumbing to the specific 
conditions attached by the IMF in return for its assistance. Indeed, it is worth 
emphasising that Mahathir's depiction of IMF assistance packages as simply a 
mechanism for imposing a new "Western" order on the region is actually supported 
by the IMF itself: one of the principal reasons the IMF acted to scuttle any proposed 
Asian rescue package was precisely the possibility that it would adopt a much more 
tolerant view of East Asian government-busin ess relations and fail to inaugurate 
long-term structural change. [37] The "overriding objective" of Malaysian policy, by 
contrast, was to "insulate the economy" from the disciplinary impact of market forces. 
[38] 
 
A couple of points about Malaysia's response to the challenge of greater intra- and 
inter-regional political interaction merit emphasis. First, unlike the Western European 
experience, economic cooperation within the East Asian region has not necessarily 
been envisaged as part of a process of greater political integration. East Asian 
organisations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been 
intended to reinforce the nation-state rather than pool or dilute its sovereignty. In this 
respect, Mahathir's efforts to insulate Malaysia from the intrusive attentions of 
organisations like the IMF, and the imperatives of economic integration, maybe 
giving expression to a more widely held Asian perspective. [39] Where externally 
generated reform initiatives threaten to unravel the entire domestic political economy 
and the complex balance of forces that underpin it, creating institutions or 
mechanisms with which to mediate such forces is clearly an attractive option. Second, 
Mahathir enjoys a degree o f domestic political support that, despite the traumas 
associated with Anwar's dismissal, makes the continuing pursuit of national economic 
autonomy worthwhile. As Khoo Boo Teik reminds us, "Most Malaysians could not 
remember a time of greater prosperity or lesser inter-ethnic recrimination than the 
mid-1990s. Economic indicators alone would not have captured the pride that 
Malaysians discovered, perhaps for the first time, in being Malaysian." [40] In short, 
not only can globalisation still be resisted or distinctively mediated by local 




Let me emphasise in these concluding remarks that I have not been attempting to 
develop a defense of Mahathir's authoritarian political leadership or to justify the 
networks of patronage and influence over which he has presided. Far from it. Yet, 
whatever we may think about Mahathir as an individual or the strategies he employs 
to maintain his grip on power, there is no doubt that he continues to highlight and give 
voice to issues which are of great importance in East Asia and central to the operation 
of the contemporary global political economy. In short, the Malaysian experience tells 
us much about the possibilities for national economic autonomy in an era 
characterised by processes of globalisation. There are thus a number of important 
lessons to be drawn. 
 
First, contingent national circumstances continue to matter, even in an increasingly 
integrated global political economy. Malaysia's domestic political imperatives may be 
more acute than most, but they suggest that politicians -- even authoritarian ones -- 
will find ways to reflect the interests of influential domestic forces. The distinctive 
genius of Malaysia's political leadership may be, as Jesudason argues, [41] its 
capacity for "reflexive monitoring of internal and external economic and political 
conditions," and for reflecting such forces in policy. Whatever outsiders may think of 
Mahathir and Malaysian politics, he continues to enjoy significant -- if occasionally 
grudging -- domestic support. The ethnic cataclysm that continues to menace 
Indonesia in the wake of the crisis is the frequently cited specter that Malaysians seek 
to avoid. In such circumstances, many Malaysians appear willing to trade off 
immediate political liberalisation for the prospect of continuing ethnic and economic 
stability. 
 
This leads to a second lesson: even small economies like Malaysia's retain effective 
policy instruments that allow political elites to continue exercising a surprisingly high 
degree of autonomy. Whether it is the type of industrial policies that have been 
associated with East Asian development generally, or in such specific innovations as 
the application of currency controls, there are a number of strategies available to 
policymakers which appear both to confer autonomy and to be actually capable of 
achieving some of their intended goals. There is another associated point that merits 
emphasis: the Malaysian experience strongly suggests that such policies can be 
implemented effectively without the existence of an autonomous bureaucracy of the 
sort associated with Japan in its heyday. Whether the possible benefits of such 
interventions accrue to Malaysians-in-general, or to a well-connected elite, is another, 
highly political, question. The key point, however, is that whatever the motivations 
may have been for pursuing policies of insulation and independence, Malaysia 
demonstrated that such policies are possible, even in an international system 
dominated by the interests of financial capital and powerful multilateral agencies. 
 
Or then again, perhaps not. One of the most intriguing contradictions of the Malaysian 
case is that, having demonstrated that it is possible to resist the dominance of global 
financial interests, Malaysian policymakers appear to be systematically dismantling 
their defenses and reintegrating with the wider international system. [42] Having 
established powerful, and not entirely self-serving arguments as to why small nations 
should not expose themselves to the vicissitudes of international financial markets and 
short-term capital flows, Malaysia seems intent on following the conventional 
"Western" wisdom and rejoining the international system. Perhaps the most 
significant, if paradoxical, lesson to emerge from Malaysia's recent experience is that, 
despite the apparent dangers, both economic and political, neoliberal ideas and the 
powerful agencies, market actors and nations that support them are proving 
increasingly difficult to resist, even where there seem to be powerful motives and 
capacities to do so. 
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